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than he has been before and to attain to the state in which "there is no more cowering before fate, no more surrender of self-respect to escape the hand of abuse. The soul has awakened to the fact that it is stronger than all its enemies and is at rest."

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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of View. By Marion LeRoy Burton, B.D., Ph.D., President of Smith College. Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. Pp. 234.

This is a weighty and important treatment of an ever-interesting theme. The book has eight chapters of careful and condensed review and appreciation, as well as criticism, of Augustine's theory of evil. It starts with a clear statement of the questions by which Augustine was confronted in his apology for Christianity. In opposition to Manichæism he had to maintain the unity and the all-controlling sovereignty of God. Dr. Burton points out the uncompromising attitude Augustine took on the subject of whether God was the source of all things, and shows that in Augustine's theory nature was God's creation, and therefore must be inherently good. Augustine, however, also taught, as Dr. Burton shows, that nature was created *ex nihilo*, and thus opens the way for his doctrine of sin as privative, and a *deficiens*. He also confuses *malum* and *peccatum*, and in his discussion of what is *malum* declares it to be a *privatio boni*, a corruption or negation, and hence not a created nature. Then in the third and fourth chapters the author gathers together Augustine's answer to the question: Whence comes the evil? Quite justly it is pointed out that Augustine definitely tried to reject the Manichæism and its dualism in which he had lived for nine years; and in a rapid but most admirable survey of the important passages Dr. Burton shows how Augustine rejected the evil principle theory; the theory of its source in nature; the preëxistence theory; the "flesh" theory, and the theory of contrast. Then he goes on to show how firmly Augustine held and defended the theory that sin was in the will, and that whether in the preëxistent world of angels or in the world of human life the seat of evil was with Augustine always regarded as being found in the will.

In the fifth chapter the freedom of the will is discussed, and the controversy with Pelagius is entered upon, and the various kinds of freedom are given. We are admirably and clearly introduced to Augustine's distinction between *causa efficiens* and *causa deficiens*. In the sixth chapter the conception of sin as original and actual, is briefly treated, and in the closing two chapters we have the final outcome pointed out, and then a very cool, calm, and searching criticism of the whole position with an exceedingly sympathetic attempt to retain the elements of permanent value, while rejecting the faulty metaphysics, and the false conceptions of a non-evolutionary world of thought.

The wealth of reference to Augustine, and the fine frankness with which passages are fully quoted, which make difficulties for the commentator, mark the scientific and candid spirit in which a most admirable piece of work is done.

At the same time the present writer is not convinced that even the searching criticism of Dr. Burton's last chapter quite fully sets forth the real weakness of the teaching of Augustine. In spite of all Augustine's endeavors to free himself from the errors of Manichæism, he simply did not do it. The very doctrine of metaphysical imperfection in the created nature which leads to his treating corruption as possible, and in some passages as in the "Enchiridion," Chapters IX to XIV, as a self-destroying element, leaves the door open for the establishment of a permanent dualism in a corrupted mass of humanity eternally doomed to sin and *evil existence* out of which only a number are saved. And the inevitable result of this was to weaken the force of Augustine's otherwise clear teaching of sin as rising in the will, and to a transference of sin to the corrupted flesh. So that in passage after passage Augustine talks of the corruption of the flesh as the sinful taint, and not simply now as a penalty for *peccatum*, but as a source of *peccatum*. Some of these passages Dr. Burton himself quotes.

In fact, Dr. Burton treats Augustine as altogether too self-consistent. Augustine in dealing with the Pelagians uses language thoroughly dualistic. And for popular purposes the Devil becomes the principle of evil, and God's grace the principle of good. And even while claiming all created things as good, so far as they are from God, he admits the eternal existence of corrupted nature apart from God. As over against

the Manichæans, Augustine maintained a certain freedom of the will, and as over against the Pelagians, he maintained the entire inability of man save only as a grace that is irresistible lays hold of him. Dr. Burton has not, we think, sufficiently remembered that Augustine was a furious apologist for a system he took over on authority. He was aiming far more at crushing his opponents than at establishing a self-consistent theology or philosophy. An exceedingly crass realism jostles in Augustine with idealism, and even while treating of corruption as self-consuming, he postulates its eternal character. Indeed, his conception of God as the only unchanging good leaves all created things unstable and only relatively good, so that the fall becomes inevitable, and once man has fallen we have established an evil in nature of which their nature eternally partakes. Here all the religious defects of Manichæism reappear. His treatment of baptism is most vulgarly dualistic, and he drops back into the mechanical corruption of Manichæism, and proclaims baptism as the magic freedom-giving rite.

An ever-present churchly interest dominates the thought of Augustine, and hence logic is never in complete control of the field. This organization interest shines out most in Augustine's controversy with the Donatists, where he makes baptism ordinarily essential to salvation, and treats it in the grossest way as a magic for the purification of the flesh. And this purification goes on without any exercise of the will in the case of infants.

Nor can we think that Augustine's defense of marriage can be taken as seriously representing the New Testament point of view. Only an ideal marriage, impossible since the fall, is really pure, and even in the marriage relationship of Christian parents the children are polluted in the very inception. Here it cannot be a case of sin in the will, but is a pollution transferred to the flesh, and it becomes in the flesh a *causa efficiens* of evil, which only baptism can wash away. We may readily explain Augustine's position, but we cannot defend it, and he became the father of a Catholic theology with a crude dualism corrupting the thought of God at its very source, with a sacramental magic made necessary by the external pollution of the corporeal life.

Dr. Burton's criticisms in the last chapter are exceedingly just and clear, but do not seem to the present writer to deal

thoroughly enough with the actual dualism that underlies all Augustine's thought.

The book has a useful bibliography, although not professing to be complete, and the clearness of style and constant insistence upon the points made, make the work a most valuable apology for Augustine's theology.

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HABIT-FORMATION AND THE SCIENCE OF TEACHING. By Stuart H. Rowe, Ph.D. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1909. Pp. xvii, 308.

The object of this volume is to emphasize the fundamental place of habit in our mental economy, to indicate the more important habits to be developed during the school years, to analyze the mechanism of habit-formation, and to instruct teachers and parents in the methods to be followed in making good, and in breaking bad, habits.

In a way, it would be correct to say that Rowe has used nothing but the stock concepts with which we are all familiar in the classic chapter of James on habit, but it must be admitted that he has done a valuable service in exploiting these concepts more fully and more carefully than James or any other previous writer in this field. Instructors who have used James as a classroom text cannot fail to have noted that, while the average student is attracted and even fascinated by the literary qualities of his treatment, he often does not, as a matter of fact, carry away from his reading systematized, serviceable, and permanent information about the substance of the text. This criticism cannot be directed against Rowe's book, for his treatment is detailed and systematic,—perhaps at times so over-systematic as to impress one with a sense of Kantian formality,—and yet at the same time enriched by analyses of concrete habits of so much value that we would gladly see more of them worked out for the prospective teacher.

The fundamental topics of which the volume treats are the distinction between habits and ideas, the selection of habits, methods of evoking initiative, methods of securing practice in habit-forming, methods of preventing exceptions and methods